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Abstract 
Country rankings with respect to a country’s business environment draw strong 
international attention. Methods of business environment assessment differ, two 
competing methods will be described and compared with respect to their results 
for Rwanda in the years 2008-2010. They do not come to the same results 
regarding regulatory deficits and hence the demand for regulatory reform. When 
regulatory cost is considered, demand and supply of reforms are more in line than 
without cost considerations. The effectiveness of reforms undertaken in Rwanda 
varies. Based on interviews in late 2010, not all reforms were having the expected 
impact “on the ground”.  
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Introduction 
 
1.1. Overview 
 
 “„Red Tape‟ is a short hand for unnecessary or excessively complicated 
regulations and inefficient administrative processes” (SBP,2008,9).  
 “The expression „red tape‟ refers to any unnecessary or redundant 
regulation that hinders productivity. (CFIB,2010,2) 
 
Reduction of Red Tape is supposed to reduce business cost and therefore 
contribute to the level and growth GDP. It is a part of Good Governance1. The 
degree of Red Tape existing in a country‟s business environment is measured by 
a variety of measures and rankings. If positive, they are used by governments in 
their internal and external PR strategies.  
 
The goal of this paper is to assess whether methods for evaluation of business 
regulatory environments paint a true picture of the regulatory regimes and thus  
contribute to Good Governance. The case analyzed here is Rwanda.  
 
The first chapter briefly outlines the different methods of business environment 
analysis and the empirical evidence on the relevance of  business environment 
reform for growth. The second chapter explores two competing concepts of 
business environment assessment in more depth: first, the SBP approach which 
is based on surveys of subjective perceptions of businesses, and second the 
World Bank‟s Doing Business (DB) Indicators which measure regulations as 
decreed by authorities. Both approaches will be compared with regard to 
 Goals 
 Method of gathering information 
 Types of businesses considered 
 Regional and sectoral scope  
 Estimation of regulatory cost 
 Ability to measure correctly supply of reforms be the government (DB) and 
demand for reforms by businesses (SBP) 
 Effects on the government‟s reform agenda 
 
The third chapter focuses on the results of both the DB and the SBP approach 
with regard to Rwanda. First, economic reforms as decreed by the Rwandan 
government will be described. This constitutes the supply side of business 
environment reforms. DB will then be analyzed regarding its accuracy of 
                                                             
1
 The World bank conceives business environment regulation as one of 16 criteria for good 
governance. (World Bank, 2005,15) 
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measuring the supply side. The results of the SBP exercise of 2008 represent the 
demand side 2 for reforms. Demand and supply of reforms will then be compared 
in order to establish whether the Rwandan government by its policy met the 
demands of the business sector. Finally, the third chapter will compare the results 
of a survey of business environment conducted in 2010 with the assessment of 
the business environment by DB in the same year. This comparison is then used 
to evaluate whether the reforms undertaken in Rwanda between 2008 and 2010 
have actually been effective and thus have contributed to the overall goal of Good 
Governance.  
 
 
1.2. Measures of Business Environment Quality 
 
The analysis of a country‟s business environment as performed by the World 
Bank‟s Doing Business (DB) Project has gained both increasing public and private 
attention. Latest results of this annual exercise have been widely published and 
commented (e.g. Economist, 2010,71-73); governments see the results as a 
measure of their reform efforts or use it as vehicle to initiate such reforms. Firms 
and investors in particular see it as a measure of the ease of doing business in a 
country. As a matter of fact, the DB‟s overall ranking of countries is called the 
“Ease of Doing Business Indicator”. 
 
Ever since its inception, the DB project has been receiving critical reviews. The 
World Bank Doing Business Webpage3 provides for a section listing major 
analytical work done with respect to the DB methodology. On top of that, Google 
Scholar lists over 1.5 million entries that relate to the DB project.  
 
The methodology underlying DB is not undisputed and has led to internal 
evaluation of the project (IEG, 2008). Also, DB is not the only approach to 
measuring business environment. The World Bank undertakes two more projects 
(Investment Climate Index and Business Enterprise Surveys); outside the World 
Bank there are assessments provided by the World Economic Forum (Global 
Competitiveness Report), the UNCTAD (World Investment Report) and private 
sources like the Economist Intelligence Unit, to name a few. 45 
 
                                                             
2
 For demand for institutional change: (Streeck/Thelen, 2005, pp2). 
3
 http://www.doingbusiness.org/  
4
 Comparative analyses of measures of business environment are numerous. Most of them focus on 
the different methods of calculating the cost of regulation to businesses. Also, most of them start from 
the factual regulation as determined by government decrees. Few, however, include in their analysis 
the subjective perception of business regulation within a wider framework of general market 
conditions. An exception is (FIAS,2009). 
5 For a comparison of the World Bank’s Doing Business approach and the Business Enterprise Survey approach 
see http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Methodology/Compare.aspx 
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These approaches complement the DB project; however, in 2008 an alternative to 
DB was initiated for Rwanda by the country‟s Private Sector Federation (PSF), the 
major Rwandan association of private firms 6. The resulting report “Cutting the 
cost of Red Tape” (short: Red Tape Report, RTR) analyses areas of business 
environment similar to those of DB, but employs a different methodological 
approach (SBP, 2008). In view of the remarkable improvement of Rwanda‟s 
position in the DB rankings after publication of this report, the question arises 
whether the reforms are attributable to DB, RTR, or both. The underlying 
methodologies and their results will be compared.  
 
Generally speaking, the RTR method of information gathering is perception-
based, relying on a large number of respondents, whereas the DB method is 
mainly fact based, relying on a comparatively small number of respondents.  
 
 RTR allows for the determination of regulatory cost by sector, firm size and 
region, whereas DB assumes a standard business case 
 RTR is part of a comprehensive Public Private Dialogue, whereas DB is 
selectively including administration representatives.  
 
The differences in quality and quantity of results of the competing approaches will 
be analyzed in this paper. 
 
Table 1: Assessing the business environment 7 
 
 
1.3. The regulation – growth connex  
                                                             
6  This report is one of the results of the project “Promotion of the economy and employment” commissioned 
by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and co-funded by the Royal 
Netherlands Embassy to Rwanda; the project duration is from 2004 to 2013. GTZ on behalf of BMZ implements 
this project, which, apart from the so-called Red Tape analysis consists of further instruments (e.g. business 
and investment climate surveys, Regulatory Impact Assessment)  to strengthen the private sector and  improve 
the business environment in Rwanda. 
 
7
 For a more detailed description of the types of analysis see (SBP,2008,15) 
8
 Ex ante evaluation / RIA is part of the GTZ project, but not subject of discussion here 
Type of analysis Information provided by Application 
Fact based analysis Expert informants DB 
Evidence/perception based Firms, management Regulatory Review (RTR) 
Procedural audit, based on 
time and motion study 
Government agencies and 
their clients 
Ex post evaluation of 
regulations / DB / RTR 
Regulatory Impact Analysis 
(RIA) 
Affected stakeholder groups Ex ante evaluation of 
regulations 
8
 
7 
 
 
In order to assess the relevance of business environment studies, the role of the 
business environment for growth and investment has to be analyzed.  
 
For both, RTR and DB, the term “business environment” is defined as the set of 
regulations governing private sector activity. The rationale behind business 
environment analysis is that less cumbersome regulation will enhance growth of 
firms and employment (IEG, 2008,3). In other words, regulation, directly, though 
not solely, affects investment climate and investment activity and therefore 
growth9 (Figure 1). While most analyzes find a positive correlation between the 
quality of regulation and growth, the direction of causality is not clear. Also, it is 
not quite clear whether business regulation as measured by the DB indicators is 
strongly correlated with both factual regulation as it affects businesses and 
economic outcomes (Commander, Svejnar, 2007).  
 
Figure 1: The Regulation – Growth connex 
 
 
 
Investment climate can be differenciated into the following areas: Stability and 
Security, Regulation and Taxation, Finance and Infrastructure, and Employment 
and Labour markets (IEG,2008,4). Table 2 further differentiates these areas and 
highlights the subareas covered by DB in the shaded areas. The RTR approach is 
potentially open to all of the below mentioned areas.  
 
Research on the DB methodology shows that there the fact based and the (few) 
perception based indicators are highly correlated with other measures of 
investment climate like the Global Competitiveness Index (World Development 
Forum) and the Business Environment Rankings (Economist Intelligence Unit). 
However, there is a weaker correlation of perception-based indicators with the DB 
indicators in middle and lower income countries (IEG,2008,81, FN 4; DB11, 
2010,13)). This is of interest in the Rwandan case. 
 
                                                             
9
 a fundamental paper on the issue is: Djankov, et al, 2000; Djankov et al, 2006; for an analysis based 
on firm data in Bangladesh, India, China and Pakistan see: Dollar et al, 2003, 29; for a larger set of 
industrialized and developing countries, see Ciccone, 2007, 17; for OECD countries see Alesina et al., 
2005, 21 
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2: Elements of investment climate10 
1. Stability and 
Security 
Stability 
• Reduce political instability from civil wars, 
political conflict, etc . 
•Maintain macro-economic stability with low 
inflation, sustainable budget deficits, and 
realistic exchange rates  
 
Security of property rights 
• Reduce robbery, fraud, and other crimes 
against property 
• End uncompensated expropriation of 
property 
• Verify rights to land and other Property  
• Facilitate contract enforcement 
2. Regulation and 
Taxation 
Regulation 
• Balance market and government failures for a 
good institutional fit 
• Address regulatory cost and informality 
• Reduce uncertainty and risk in interpretation 
and implementation of existing regulations 
• Reduce regulatory barriers to competition 
Taxation 
• Broaden tax base Increase autonomy of tax 
agencies  
• Reduce corruption in tax administration 
• Confront informality 
• Simplify tax structure 
• Improve customs administration 
• Improve compliance through computerization 
3. Finance and 
Infrastructure  
4.  
Finance 
• Foster competition in the banking sector 
• Control risk-taking by banks and other 
financial institutions 
• Secure rights of borrowers, creditors, and 
shareholders 
• Improve credit information by using credit 
bureaus and stronger data protection and 
credit reporting laws 
Infrastructure 
• Improve climate for investment in 
infrastructure by securing investors‟ property 
rights, 
fostering competition, and 
encouraging private participation 
• Improve public management of 
infrastructure 
5. Employment 
and labour 
markets  
Labour Market 
• Foster a skilled and healthy workforce by 
expanding access to education, improving 
education quality, supporting life-long learning, 
and the like 
• Help workers affected by large scale 
restructurings by reinforcing social insurance 
mechanisms and reaching out to the large 
share of workers in rural and informal 
economies 
• Craft labor market interventions to benefit all 
(formal and informal) in the process of setting 
wages, regulation of working conditions, and 
hiring and firing of workers 
6.  
7. Source: adapted from 
(IEG, 2008, 4) 
 8.  
 
 
On a more disaggregated basis, of the above mentioned DB-related regulatory 
areas relevant for investment climate, none proved to be significantly correlated 
with growth, investment and employment (IEG, 2008, 36),(Eiffert,2007, 37). As 
the DB overall rankings are positively correlated with other investment climate 
measures, this raises the question to which extent the latter provide significant 
information about actual business activity and the associated macro variables.  
 
Some business surveys on the effect of regulation on productivity and investment, 
however, suggest a causal relationship between regulation and investment (CFIB, 
2010,9-10). 
 
All in all, no clear causal relationship between the measures of business 
environment and investment/growth is to be found in the literature.  
 
                                                             
10
 Shaded areas indicate types of regulation covered by DB 
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2. Methodological underpinnings of SBP and DB 
 
The approaches to business environment measurement adopted by SBP and DB 
are part of a larger set of methods that are used to assess regulation either ex 
ante or ex post. In the following sections both approaches will be introduced, and 
their distinguishing features with regard to their results will be highlighted. 
 
2.1. The SBP Approach 11 
SBP‟s RTR is based on the “regulatory review methodology”, which 
“encompasses the assessment of regulatory costs, and the identification of key 
administrative blockages and delays that contribute to these cost” (SBP,2008,14). 
RTR is based on a survey of businesses, and is therefore of a perception based 
type12. However, as the methodology gathers data on the real cost of compliance 
(cash flow, management time, and other internal resources) with existing 
regulations, it provides factual information, too. Over and above this, the aim of 
the RTR methodology is to provide information to governments on the specific 
hurdles faced by firms, allowing a government to fine tune further reform.  
 
The RTR design of a survey is country specific. The companies surveyed are 
selected to create a representative sample of the formal business sector, with 
respect to industry, size, and regional distribution13. However, SBP cooperates 
closely with national business organizations. It is not clear whether membership in 
these organizations and cooperation with the survey team are voluntary, and 
whether this may result in a bias.  
 
The areas covered by RTR were not pre-defined by a questionnaire or by SBP. 
Instead, RTR aims to cover a range of relevant regulatory hurdles as wide as 
possible. As these hurdles – and their perceptions - differ from country to country, 
this approach is not a priori open to international comparisons. Rather, an 
economy specific regulatory landscape is being created. In the case of Rwanda, 
only three significant areas of regulatory burdens emerged from the open 
questions asked: taxation, trade and labor regulations. Thus, the actual coverage 
of RTR may seem to be more  narrow, and as a matter of fact is more narrow in 
                                                             
11 
Based on the below described SBP approach, an analysis of the Rwandan business environment 
was performed and published in a report titled “Cutting the Cost of Red Tape” (in short:RTR). As the 
methodology is country specific, all descriptions of the SBP approach will refer to RTR 
12
 Perception based surveys are subjective by nature. Few surveys of business regulation include the 
subjective assessment of business regulation; a comparison of cost measurement methods used 
internationally,  compiled by Bertelsmann Stiftung, identified two out of seven methods to include 
subjective assessments (Riedel,2009,29) 
13 
In the Rwandan case, 276 large/medium and 127 small enterprises in all provinces and from all 
sectors of the economy were selected for the sample (SBP,2008,124). 
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the case of Rwanda, than that of DB, but it reflects the relative weight managers 
put on the different regulatory areas, and the relative weight of regulation vis-à-vis 
other policy areas (e.g. education, infrastructure, etc). RTR also allows to 
distinguish between government regulations and other hurdles faced by firms, 
putting into perspective the role of government 14 15.  
 
RTR does not use a standardized business case to define a typical firm. Instead, 
it allows for differentiation by geographical area, firm size, industry and other 
dimensions. This of course puts additional weight on the selection process in 
order to avoid bias with respect to one of the above dimensions 16.  
 
The sequence of questions raised runs from most general to most specific. First, 
factors generally discouraging business growth, employment, investment or any 
other area of concern are asked and ranked, yielding a distinction between 
regulatory and non-regulatory  factors (such as competitive situation, business 
cycle, infrastructure etc (SBP,2008,21,42). This is followed by questions about 
specific regulatory hurdles which allow to distinguish among the government  
agencies involved in the respective areas of concern. 
 
In a further step, the cost of regulations identified as major hurdles is assessed. 
RTR distinguishes between compliance cost, administrative cost, efficiency cost, 
and non-compliance cost (RTR, 2008,28):    
 
 
Table 3: Regulatory cost categories 
 
 
Of these cost categories, compliance cost is analyzed within the RTR framework. 
Other cost categories, and efficiency cost in particular, can be assessed indirectly 
by asking about the ways businesses try to avoid regulatory cost (e.g. outsourcing 
                                                             
14
 SBP, 2008, 21 
15
 In other words, the wide scope suggested by the DB method may overemphasize areas that are not 
actually seen as problematic by actors on the ground. 
16
 For the sample design of RTR, see section 3.4  
Category of regulatory cost Examples of Activities 
involved 
Burden on… 
Compliance Cost Time; fees to service 
providers 
Firms; economy   
Efficiency and opportunity 
cost 
Reduced business activity 
or size 
Economy  
Non-compliance cost Paying fines, bribes  Non-complying firms, 
economy 
Administrative cost Government agency 
activities  
Economy  
Source: adapted from (SBP,2008,28)   
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or limiting the firms size in order not to cross certain thresholds may increase 
inefficiency cost (SBP,2008,51)) 17.  
 
 
2.2. The Doing Business Approach 
 
The World Bank‟s Doing Business approach goes back to the year 2004 when the 
first annual report was published. It attempts to gather information on nine 
indicators that are supposed to describe regulations governing the typical life 
cycle of a firm, from starting to closing a firm. Annex 1 lists these indicators and 
the associated sub-indicators18. It should be noted that this list reflects the 
assessment of regulations as performed in the 2011 annual report. Prior to that 
date, an indicator set covering labor relations was included; this, together with 
information on electricity supply, is now presented in an annex to the annual 
report (from the 2011 on), but not included in the overall DB rankings.  
 
Data on the sub-indicators are provided by selected experts in the field, so called 
informants. These, in the case of the DB 11 report, consist of “more than 8,200 
local experts, including lawyers, business consultants, accountants, freight 
forwarders, government officials and other professionals routinely administering or 
advising on legal and regulatory requirements” (DB11,2010,109). However, as DB 
counts each completed questionnaire as one informant (IEG;2008,13), the actual 
number of experts may be considerably smaller. During the 2008 evaluation 
exercise the actual average number of questionnaire informants per indicator set 
ranged from 1 to 3.5. In other words, the average number of informants per 
country, looking at all nine indicator sets, was 9.5 persons in 2008. This number 
included lawyers (70%), government officials (18%), Accountants (8%), and other 
experts (4%), but no managers of firms conforming with the standard business 
case (see below) 19.  
 
DB data contain two types of information: first, factual information about existing 
laws and regulations, and second, time and motion information about the cost of 
obtaining clearances from authorities. However, the latter type of data are not 
recorded at the firm level, but at the agent/informant level and they reflect official 
fee schedules (DB11,2010,12), not necessarily the actual cost of obtaining 
clearances .  
                                                             
17
 For the underlying methodology of cost calculation see (SBP,2008,62). 
18
 The set of indicators has been changing over time. Therefore, a comparison of data over time has 
limitations. For a definition of the indicators valid in a particular year, see the respective annual reports 
of the DB project. The database provided online does include adjusted values for indicators, but still 
does not calculate rankings reaching back more than two years.   
19
 DB 2009 lists 22 persons for Rwanda, of which two were positively identified as belonging to a (the 
same) business (freight service) (World Bank,2009,184) 
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Informants are assuming a standard business case when evaluating the relevant 
regulations. These assumptions are listed in Annex 3. 
 
A special feature of DB is the ranking of countries along their performance with 
respect to individual indicator sets and, on this basis, along an overall “Ease of 
Dong Business” performance. The method raises a number of important issues 
which deserve attention. However, as they are beyond the scope of this paper 
they will not be dealt with here.  
 
 
2.3. Comparison of the two approaches 
 
Both, the SBP and the DB approach to measuring business environment 
regulation will be compared with regard to the criteria mentioned in section 1.1. 
 
 Goals: Both the RTR and the DB approach take measure of a country‟s 
business environment. Their stated goals are similar: to provide governments 
with a regulatory profile that allows the identification of hurdles and bottlenecks 
and to initiate reform efforts. 
 Method of gathering information: DB applies a so called “fact based” method, 
i.e. firms agents and officials dealing with regulation as it is written down in 
laws and decrees is evaluated; also, DB relies on a small number of 
informants (on average less than 10 per country). SBP follows a so called 
perception based method, i.e. it surveys firms directly with regard to how 
regulation – whether decreed or not - affects businesses on the ground. The 
number of firms is large and structured enough to allow a sample 
representative of the country‟s economic structure. Also, RTR focuses strongly 
on the cost of regulatory burdens; DB does not allow the calculation of 
aggregated regulatory cost. DB only counts the cost that is based on official 
fee schedules; the cost of compliance with the regulation is only partially 
covered where time is used as a measure of regulatory compliance. However, 
as noted above, compliance in DB is seen as activities performed by agents 
acting on behalf of firms, not as actions of firm staff themselves. It is not clear, 
whether this, apart from the type of firm definition of the standard business 
case, creates a further bias towards larger firms which can afford to hire these 
agents. Small firms, and those in transition from the informal sector into the 
formal sector in particular, are less likely to hire agents. The effect of 
regulation on this class of firms therefore is likely not to be covered by the DB 
analysis; this being in contradiction to the original DB goals which emphasize 
the transition of informal businesses into the formal sphere as a major driver of 
(official) employment, growth and investment.  Data obtained through either 
method are subject to cleaning and validation processes. These are not fully 
13 
 
transparent; they tend to allow for biases especially where a high share of 
questions are open, as is the case with the RTR.  
 Types of businesses considered: DB assumes a standard business case for 
all countries, whereas SBP surveys a sample of firms typical for the country 
concerned. DB allows a cross country comparison of results.  SBP‟s results 
are country specific. 
 Regional and sectoral scope: DB generally focuses on a country‟s capital city, 
but allows for separate studies of other regions or industry clusters within a 
country; sectors are not specified. SBP considers a country‟s regions and 
sectors as they are representative of the country‟s economic structure.  
 Estimation of regulatory cost: DB lists cost as listed in official fee schedules. 
SPB estimates the total cost of compliance with regulations at the firm, 
regional, sectoral, and macro level. 
 Ability to measure correctly supply of regulatory reforms by the government 
(DB) and demand for reforms by businesses (SBP): DB measures reforms as 
they are decreed. This should allow for a correct description of a governments 
reform efforts when communication with the authorities is working. SBP cannot 
measure supply of reforms, but rather forms a basis for demand of reforms as 
firms are listing the major hurdles to doing business. The adequacy of the 
demand estimation relies heavily on the quality of data generation.  
 Effects on government reform agenda: The approaches differ in their effects: 
whereas the SBP approach – due to its country specific nature - is not easily 
open to cross country comparisons, the DB approach is best known for its 
country rankings. On the other hand, the RTR approach allows governments 
to target regulatory reform in such a way as to relieve firms from the most 
cumbersome and costly regulators burdens. DB is less well suited to yield this 
result, because the measured business environment reflects laws as they are 
written rather than their enforcement and effect on businesses “on the ground” 
(see for this distinction: La Porta et al, 2008, 293). 
 
 
 
3. Case study Rwanda 
 
This chapter focuses on the results of both the DB and the SBP approach with 
regard to Rwanda. First, economic reforms as decreed by the Rwandan 
government will be described. This constitutes the supply side of business 
environment reforms. DB will then be analyzed regarding its accuracy of 
measuring the supply side. The results of the SBP approach of 2008 are 
interpreted as a measure of the demand side. Demand and supply of reforms will 
then be compared in order to establish whether the Rwandan government by its 
policy met the demands of the business sector. Finally, the third chapter will 
compare the results of a survey of business environment conducted in 2010 with 
14 
 
the assessment of the business environment by DB in the same year. This 
comparison is then used to evaluate whether the reforms undertaken in Rwanda 
between 2008 and 2010 have actually been effective and thus have contributed to 
the overall goal of Good Governance. 
 
3.1. Economic environment and economic reforms in Rwanda 
 
First, the major sources of information on the business environment in Rwanda 
will be sketched. This is followed by an overview of reforms in Rwanda since 2007 
as stated by the Rwandan government.  
  
Major sources of information about the Rwandan regulatory environment are the 
Rwanda government and the World Bank. The World Bank mostly lists reforms 
documented in its DB Database. Other sources of information on the reform 
efforts of the Rwandan government are scarce and scattered, sometimes only 
indicative of reforms. The latest WTO Trade Policy Review dates from 2004 and 
therefore does not include the period of reforms. The IMF commends Rwanda‟s 
successful macroeconomic adjustment. In June 2010, Rwanda adopted the IMF‟s 
PSI program (Policy Support Instrument) which is open to countries that do not 
depend on financial assistance from the IMF anymore (Gershenson,2010). IMF 
International Financial Statistics (IFS) at the time of writing do not offer relevant 
data beyond 2008. UNCTAD data show that between 2007 and 2009 Rwanda 
recorded an annual increase in FDI inflows of 20% (UNCTAD, 2010, 168); its FDI 
stock rose fivefold in each of the decades 1990-2000 and 2000-2010 
(UNCTAD,2010,173). 20 
 
Reforms of the business environment regulation undertaken in Rwanda as stated 
by the government are summarized in table 4b. Over the period 2007 to 2010 a 
total of 21 reforms were implemented. In terms of the  DB indicator categories, the 
largest number of them focused on taxes, trade, and property registration.  Most 
of the reforms occurred in the year 2009/2010.  
 
 
                                                             
20
 It is interesting to note that although within an international country ranking of FDI inflows Rwanda 
jumped from rank 105 to rank 65 in only two years, the FDI inward potential index for Rwanda barely 
changed between 2007 and 2008 (UNCTAD, 20102,2). It would be interesting to see whether 
economic reforms after 2008 will have an impact on this outcome-oriented indicator. 
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3.2. Registration and timing of reforms by the World Bank Doing Business 
Database 
 
In this section, the sequence of business environment changes as identified by 
DB will be compared with those reported by the Rwandan government in order to 
evaluate the accuracy of reform measurement by DB.  
 
Figures 2 – 9 illustrate the timing of regulatory reforms in Rwanda. The graphs are 
based on data reported in the DB annual reports 21 They show the development 
of DB sub-indicators of business regulation by means of index values. The base 
of these values is 1 for the year the sub indicator was first observed by DB.  It 
becomes clear that most of the economic reforms in Rwanda recorded by DB 
occurred in 2008 or in the following years. These data confirm the description of 
reforms by the government and international organizations, (the sources 
presented in section 3.1). It is confirmed, too, by tables 4a and 4b which list 
reform activities as reported indirectly by DB and directly by the Rwandan 
government.  
 
Figures 2 to 9: Timing of reforms in Rwanda 
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 The years in Figures 1-9 are years of DB annual reports, not years of reforms 
16 
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Tables 4a and 4b list the areas of economic reform between 2008 and 2010, 
based on the Doing Business annual reports 2009 – 2011, and on reports of the 
Ministry of Trade and Industry, for comparison. According to DB reports, the 
largest number of reforms (7) occurred in the year 2008/2009, most of the reform 
activities over the period (3) focused on the financial sector, and here on the 
credit availability to firms. This table differs considerably from official information 
provided by the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Government of Rwanda (see 
Table 7 and Annex 2). There, for 2008/2009 six areas of reform including seven 
measures are listed, and for 2009/2010 seven areas of reform including 14 
measures are listed. The differences in the number of affected areas may be 
explained by different definitions of dates when regulations become effective. Still, 
the fact that DB includes government officials among its informers should warrant 
a single timeline of reforms.  
 
As a supporting illustration only, Table 5 may be used. It shows Rwanda‟s 
international rankings with respect to the nine DB indicator sets. However, due to 
the relative nature of rankings, they do not necessarily show factual 
improvements. Still, as a worsened regulatory environment has seldom been 
identified in the DB annual reports, a general and global trend towards 
improvement may be assumed. In this case. positive changes in rankings point to 
improvements in the business environment that exceed those of other countries in 
the same quantile. For Rwanda, positive changes in rankings clearly 
18 
 
outnumbered negative ones by 6 to 3 and 6 to 2 in the DB reports of 2010 and 
2011, covering the years 2008/09 and 2009/10. In the years before, the positive 
and negative changes were more or less balanced. This may be taken as am 
indication of stronger reform activity in the later years.  
 
The various comparisons of data published by the Rwandan government and by 
DB point to a correct description of both timing and sectoral distribution of 
business environment reforms by DB.  
 
Table 4a: Reforms in Rwanda 2008-2010 according to 
DB annual reports  
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2009/2010 
 
X 
 
X 
  
X 
  
3 
Sector 
total 1 2 1 3 1 1 2 2 1 14 
Source: based on annual DB reports 
 
Table 4b: Reforms in Rwanda 2008-2010 according to 
Government reports  
   
Years 
covered S
ta
rt
in
g
 a
 B
u
s
in
e
s
s
 
D
e
a
lin
g
 w
it
h
 C
o
n
s
tr
u
c
ti
o
n
 
P
e
rm
it
s
 
R
e
g
is
te
ri
n
g
 P
ro
p
e
rt
y
 
G
e
tt
in
g
 C
re
d
it
 
P
ro
te
c
ti
n
g
 I
n
v
e
s
to
rs
 
P
a
y
in
g
 T
a
x
e
s
 
T
ra
d
in
g
 A
c
ro
s
s
 B
o
rd
e
rs
 
E
n
fo
rc
in
g
 c
o
n
tr
a
c
ts
 
C
lo
s
in
g
 a
 b
u
s
in
e
s
s
 
A
n
n
u
a
l 
to
ta
l 
2007/2008 
          2008/2009 2 1 1 1 1 1 
   
7 
2009/2010 1 2 3 1 
 
3 4 
 
1 14 
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total 3 3 4 2 1 4 4 0 1 21 
Source: based on Table 7 
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3.3. Assessment of the regulatory environment in Rwanda in 2008 by DB  
 
In this section a qualitative assessment of the Rwandan business environment as 
measured by the DB indicator is attempted. In a later section this will then be 
compared with the assessment by SBP. 
 
DB does not directly provide information on strengths and weaknesses of a 
country‟s regulatory environment. This can only be concluded from a country‟s 
relative position in the international ranking. However, an international ranking 
does not necessarily reflect the valuation of the regulatory environment from a 
domestic business‟ perspective; rather, these rankings are indicative of an 
outsider‟s perception of Rwanda. This view is taken seriously by the Rwandan 
government as it cites the international rankings of Rwanda in frequently in its 
documents (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2009,24; Ministry of Trade and 
Industry, 2010,20). Table 5 shows the rankings for Rwanda as published in the 
respective annual reports. They can be considered to reflect the international 
perception of the strengths and weaknesses of Rwanda‟s regulatory environment.  
 
For both DB 2007 and DB 2008 regulation of the financial sector (both investor 
protection and credit markets) and of foreign trade appear to be relatively 
unfavorable. Table 4a showed that these areas were attracting above average 
reform activities during the years 2008 and 2009. On the other hand, enforcing 
contracts and starting a business were also reformed in two years, despite the 
fact that rankings in these areas were relatively benign from the beginning. 
Therefore, it cannot be concluded from the data that the government targeted 
reforms to those areas that were attracting negative international attention, neither 
does it prove that these badly ranked areas were in fact areas of major concern to 
the government, or businesses in Rwanda22. However, the government‟s 
accelerated reform activities coincided with a drop in the total ranking in DB 2007 
from 139 to 158. In other words, the DB data do not provide a conclusive 
indication of relative strengths or weaknesses of individual regulatory areas in 
Rwanda as perceived by the local businesses.  
 
                                                             
22 Still, the government points out: “The reforms were led by the Investment Climate Department in 
MINICOM and the Doing Business Unit at RDB, co-ordinated by the national Doing Business 
Taskforce. This team has ensured the carrying through of a number of reforms that have led to the 
indicator improvements in the Doing Business Report.” (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2009,24) 
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Table 5: Rwanda’s rank with regard to DB indicator sets 
Starting a 
Business
Dealing with 
Construction 
Permits
Registering 
Property
Getting 
Credit
Protecting 
Investors
Paying Taxes
Trading 
Across 
Borders
Enforcing 
Contracts
Closing a 
Business
Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank
DB2004 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
DB2005 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
DB2006 139 ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ..
DB2007 158 58 133 134 159 162 83 175 69 151
DB2008 150 63 124 137 158 165 50 166 44 178
DB2009 139 60 90 60 145 170 56 168 48 181
DB2010 67 11 89 38 61 27 60 170 40 183
DB2011 58 9 82 41 32 28 43 159 39 183
Year
Ease of Doing 
Business 
Rank
 
 
3.4. Assessment of the regulatory environment in Rwanda in 2008 by RTR  
 
In this section, the qualitative assessment as measured by the RTR will be 
described. The results of this assessments can be considered to build the 
demand side for reforms. This demand will then be compared with the reforms 
actually undertaken, thus allowing an evaluation of the adequacy of business 
environment reforms in Rwanda.  
 
The evaluation of the Rwandan business environment by RTR was done in 2008. 
The survey included 403 companies, of which two thirds are large and medium 
firms (the firms surveyed constitute 10% of all large and medium firms in 
Rwanda.). Of the firms surveyed, 236 were based in the capital, Kigali, the 
remainder being based in equal shares in the Western, Northern, Southern and 
Eastern provinces. All sectors of the economy were covered.   
 
Table 6 illustrates the results of the SBP analysis. It lists barriers to business 
growth in order of importance23 as stated by the respondents. These barriers are 
then structured in such a way that they can be assigned to the regulatory 
categories applied by DB.  
 
Apart from the most pressing concern about “lack of demand” 24, the most 
important regulatory barrier (here listed as No 1) concerns obtaining financial 
funds, which can be related to two DB indicator areas (access to credit, investor 
protection). The third most important barrier concerns taxation, both the level of 
taxes and the effort of complying with tax laws. The barriers mentioned less 
                                                             
23
 It should be noted that the listed barriers are the result of answers to open questions. For detailed 
results, see (SBP, 2008, 21). 
24
 The most important barrier was considered to be lack of demand which is interpreted by the SBP 
authors as an indication of marketing weaknesses of many firms; it therefore is not a regulatory issue 
and the analysis does not apply. 
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frequently are either not of a regulatory nature (“high costs”) or are too general 
(“regulation”) or were mentioned by only a small number of respondents. 
Regulation, according to RTR, is an issue for at least 25% of respondents.  
 
Taxation, labor regulation and skills emerged as the most important item when 
respondents were asked to name regulatory issues, constraints on employment, 
interaction with the government, and “time consuming and troublesome” 
regulations in more detail (SBP,2008,pp42). In the latter category, business 
registration and closure were mentioned. 
 
For Rwanda, the order of importance to businesses of these areas proves to be 
valid across business sectors, firm size and geographical area. Not surprisingly, 
two of the areas of concern (taxation, Import/Export regimes) were mentioned as 
priority areas for regulatory reform 25.  
 
Table 7 disaggregates the concerns of businesses. They are listed from a more 
general (level 1) to a very specific level (3). These specific concerns are then 
compared with reform activities of the Rwandan government since 2008. Thus, 
they can be interpreted as demand for and supply of reforms in Rwanda.  
 
Summarizing demand for and supply of reforms as defined above, reforms were 
covering all but one indicator set of the DB database. With respect to the 20 more 
specific concerns of businesses as described by the RTR report, 7 were covered 
by reforms, and 13 areas were not covered. Did the reforms address the needs of 
RTR respondents, i.e. of Rwandan businesses? They did with respect to 
availability of capital, they were partly consistent with RTR revealed need in 
registration/closure of businesses, and were more or less beside the point 
(reforming where RTR did not detect demand) in three areas. This points to a bias 
of reform design towards the DB indicators.  
 
                                                             
25
 It would be interesting to see whether this order of importance appears in other countries, too. SBP 
has not published any other comparable studies, though.  Alternatively, a cross country analysis of the 
World Bank‟s enterprise survey data (which are also perception based) could be attempted.  
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Table 6: Areas and adequacy of Rwandan regulatory reform 
Area of reform Demand 
mostly 
met?  
Detailed description  
1. Access to 
capital 
Yes The most important area of concern, lack of capital, was tackled 
by two reforms in 2008/09 and one further reform in the following 
year. These reforms provide for regulations that deal with the 
most pressing needs of borrowers and lenders, i.e. pledging 
mobile collateral and establishment of a credit registry. The latter 
is confirmed by data in Figure 5. 
2. Taxation partly The second most important area of concern, taxation, was 
covered by one reform in 2008/09 and another three measures in 
2009/10. The reforms make the process of declaring tax easier, 
but they fail to deal with the  issue  of communication with RRA, 
which can be rooted to lack of skills and inefficient organizational 
structures within RRA. Also, the decision on and level of penalties 
were not tackled.  
3. Registration/ 
closure of 
business 
Supply > 
demand 
Registration and closure of businesses constitutes another area of 
concern. Neither of these areas was specified by respondents; 
nonetheless, the first was the subject of reforms: opening a 
business has been made more easy through two reforms in each 
year , business closure issues were not dealt with.  
4. Labor no The area of labor regulations was not specified as a high ranking 
area of concern by respondents. However, the RTR spelled out 
the weaknesses under the heading “regulation” in detail. Still, no 
reforms were undertaken in the two years, with the exception of 
online income and value added tax payments. The liberalization of 
work permits for foreigners preceded that time.  
5. Trade Partly Weaknesses in the area of foreign trade regulation, presumed to 
be included in concerns about regulation in general, was 
described in more detail in the RTR, too. Here, of five 
weaknesses listed in RTR, two were covered by reforms in the 
second year. They mostly dealt with speedier processing of 
documents, whereas complaints about ineffective and 
insufficiently skilled staff where not covered.  
6. Other  Supply > 
demand 
Areas not mentioned by businesses in the RTR like registration of 
property issuing of construction permits where covered by one 
reform each in 2008/09 and two reforms each in 2009/10. 
Incidentally, those areas (like opening and closing a business, see 
above), feature prominently on the Doing Business list of 
indicators.  
 
 
The demand/supply approach to reforms may provide a political economy type of 
explanation. A different tack would be taken if the government is assumed to 
behave as a benevolent dictator. In this case its goal would be to reduce the cost 
of regulation26.  
 
The RTR offers insights into the cost of regulation to businesses (SBP,2008, 
ch.7). A hypothesis for how the government prioritizes reforms is to assume that 
most costly regulations would be tackled either first or most intensively.  
                                                             
26
 Gross cost, as regulation benefits are not addressed 
23 
 
Figure 10: Regulatory Cost in Rwanda, 2008 
 
 
 
Figure 10 provides an overview of regulatory reform for five firm size groups, 
measured by the number of employees (<5,5-49,50-99,100+) 27. Clearly, taxation 
and inbound trade constitute the activities that suffer from the most expensive 
regulations. In fact, both areas are covered by the reforms. The government 
based reform count (see Table 4b) reflects the cost determined priorities more 
strongly than the reform count by DB. This might be due to both the high political 
visibility that the RTR‟s cost calculations activities had. Also the Public Private 
Dialogue mechanism28  underlying the Economic cooperation program of which 
RTR is a part may have contributed to this effect.  
 
It cannot be excluded that the use of cost estimates has a stronger effect on the 
government‟s reform efforts than non-monetized indicators. (i.e. the pure 
responses to either the fact based or perception based questionnaires). This 
makes the cost based approach a potentially powerful tool for reform design.  
 
 
 
                                                             
27
 The seemingly lower cost for larger firms is due to the small number of large firms; e.g. the sample 
underlying RTR contained up to 21000 small firms, and up to 112 large firms. 
28
 This was confirmed by Emmanuel Hategeka, Permanent Secretary, Ministry  of Trade and Industry. 
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Table 7: Demand for and supply of regulatory reform in Rwanda, 2008-2010 
Level 1: general 
business barriers 
% of 
res-
pon-
dents 
Level 2: 
regulation 
(DB areas) 
Level 3: specific regulatory barrier Reforms 2008/2009 Reforms 2009/2010 
Lack of demand   >35 n.a.    
Lack of capital >35 Getting credit Difficulty in establishing collateral Mobile collateral possible Credit registry 
 Protecting 
investors 
 Bankruptcy law  
Tax >25 Tax 
compliance 
Waiting time at tax offices  Quarterly payments for SME 
Travel time to tax office Additional bank licensed for tax 
payments 
Online tax registration; 
Decentralized tax services 
Penalties for late payment, even if 
caused by RRA 
  
Multiple points of contact   
Communication from RRA   
Verification process  Online tax calculators for PAYE, 
VAT 
Audits   
 Tax level    
Competition >10 n.a.    
Regulations >5 Business 
registration 
 Registration streamlined from 
14 days to 24h 
 
Registration fee reduced  Online business registration 
Business 
closure 
  Registration fees can be paid at 
any Bank of Kigali branch 
Import 
regulations 
See below foreign trade   
Employing 
workers 
Lack of information and/or poor 
understanding of labor regulations 
  
Administrative issues, skills  of staff   
Difficulties accessing work permits 
for foreign workers 
  
Dismissal of employees, high   
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compensation cost 
Time consuming NSSF compliance   
Employee insurance, cost   
PAYE, time consuming  Online tax calculators for PAYE, 
VAT 
Contracts, inflexible   
High costs >5 Lack of skills  See labor regulation, hiring of foreign 
workers 
  
Foreign Trade Time costs of in-person interaction 
with authorities 
  
Delays at customs  24h-operations at some border 
crossings;  
Harmonization of procedures with 
EAC;  
Single window put in place; 
Asycuda++ in place 
Duties and taxes (level)   
Exemptions, low skills of customs 
staff  
  
Bureau of standards, long delays  Streamlined trade documents 
Other: environmental regulations 
(ban on plastic wrappings), delays 
with other government agencies 
involved  
  
Admin procedures >1 n.a.    
Corruption/fraud >1 n.a.    
Infrastructure >1 n.a.    
Public meetings >1 n.a.    
Other not 
mentioned  by RTR 
respondents 
 Registration of 
property 
 Property registration checklist Land sale contracts not required 
 Speedier verification of property 
ownership 
Speedier checking of files 
  Construction 
permits 
 Launch of Kigali client charter One stop procedure in Kigali 
Time limit on application processing 
   
 
3.5. Results of the sample survey in 2010 29 
 
In this section, the assessment of regulatory reform in Rwanda since 2008 is  
contrasted with the results obtained during a survey mission in November 2010. 
Following the method applied in section 3.4, the survey asked respondents about 
regulatory hurdles in the areas defined by the DB indicators. The goal is to find 
out whether the reforms decreed by the government and measured by DB were 
effective “on the ground”, i.e. whether businesses actually felt a clear 
improvement in these areas. Hence, the 2010 survey combined elements of the 
SBP approach (perception based survey) with elements of DB (pre-defined 
criteria) and thus allows an evaluation of the DB results.  
 
In November 2010, managers from 12 private sector businesses, two banks, two 
government agencies, two universities and one business association were 
interviewed. Of the businesses, five belong to the service sector, one to the 
agricultural sector, and six to the manufacturing sector. Turnover ranged from 
FRW 35m to FRW 5500, fixed employment ranged from 15 to 700 persons, and 
nine firms directly or indirectly30 were involved in cross border transactions. 
Businesses were located in the urban area of the capital, Kigali (9), in the 
provincial center area of Butare (2), and one  in rural areas. All the firms had been 
subject to the SBP exercise in 2008. 
 
The goal of the interviews was to evaluate the effects of latest regulatory reforms 
“on the ground”, i.e. whether these reforms have effectively solved businesses‟ 
problems that were either mentioned by the SBP report 31or that showed a below-
average ranking in the DB indicators.   
 
The interviews were of a semi-open question type; the managers were asked to 
describe the situation regarding the nine DB indicator sets, plus the issue of 
labour legislation (“Employing workers” in earlier DB rankings). The (open) 
answers were then coded regarding their degree of meeting the goals of the 
regulatory reform listed by DB, ranging from +1 (100% effectiveness of reform) to 
-1 (no effectiveness at all).  
 
In table 8 below, the responses for the results for the indicators are listed in their 
order of evaluation, with a high positive mean indicating that the regulatory 
burdens in the concerned DB indicator group were felt on the ground; conversely, 
a high negative mean would indicate that no relief from regulatory burdens was 
felt in the indicator group.  
                                                             
29
 The field survey was commissioned by GTZ, Rwanda.  
30
 Indirectly is defined as using imported materials or products and having to comply with regulations 
concerning usage of foreign goods or their maintenance. 
31
 All firms were involved in the survey underlying the RTR of 2008. 
 
   
Reforms with regard to indicators starting a business and registering property 
were perceived as being most successful, whereas getting credit and closing a 
business were seen as the least successful areas of regulatory reform.  
 
Table 8: Perception of regulatory reforms by business managers 
DB Indicator Mean  Description 
Starting a 
business 
+0,8 Most managers evaluated the process of opening a business very 
positively. However, two of them also reported that the situation was 
as easy before 2008. Most of them reported that apart from the 
registration process, other difficulties which were not tackled by 
reforms remain 
Registering 
Property 
+0.3 Experiences of managers diverged strongly. In some cases, recent 
registration took 21 months, in other cases it was considered to be 
very easy. One stop agencies were established at locations outside 
Kigali, too, but still the required documents to get a title have to be 
obtained from lower level agencies which have not been reformed 
and which contribute to the cumbersome nature of procedures. 
Employing 
Workers 
0 The existing laws were seen as less problematic than the lack of 
skills. In this respect, the laws governing employment of foreigners 
were seen as restrictive; this pertains to related areas , like payments 
to NSSF for expats, too. Another complaint referred to high and 
unpredictable compensation payments once employees have to be  
laid off. Generally, the hiring of workers was not seen as a problem if 
lawyers are setting up the contracts. 
Enforcing 
contracts 
-0.2 Managers know about the reforms (establishment of business case 
courts), but still do not see the legal system as a viable option to 
enforce contracts.  The reasons given are long time for decisions, 
dependent courts and corruption, as well as a large share of cash 
based transactions that are not reported to the authorities, and hence 
not enforceable. 
Construction 
permits 
-0.3 MeanRespondents stressed that severe regulatory hurdles exist at 
lower levels of decision-making. Fast track construction permissions 
require the submission of documents that have to be issued at 
district or local levels, where long delays still are common. Also, 
complaints about unskilled officials and the necessity to obtain 
permissions for minor changes of existing buildings were mentioned. 
Furthermore, heavy handed regulation in other related areas (e.g. 
the Kigali masterplan for inner city development requires owners of 
property to increase covered area by 400%) make construction per 
se more difficult. 
Paying taxes -0.3 Most managers complained that online payments were not possible; 
online registration was appreciated, though. A major problem 
appears to be tax audits, due to unskilled staff and harsh payment 
conditions. Also, the skills of tax officials regarding tax assessment 
were often questioned. VAT payments were seen as a strain on cash 
flow, as payments have to be made when the bill is issued, not when 
payment is received. This pushes many firms into cash payments, 
which in turn reduces efficiency of the financial system as a whole 
   
and reduces the transparency for the tax authorities. In fact, 
respondents, when asked about the opportunities to enforce 
contracts (see below),  mentioned that courts are not a viable option 
because many transactions were cash based and not reported to the 
tax authorities. 
Trading across 
borders 
-0.4 Generally, processes were sped up, but lacking skills of customs 
officials lead to disputes over customs valuation in many cases. 
These  problems lead to a delay outside the activities covered by the 
reforms. 
Closing a 
business 
-0.5 Generally the law is seen as good, but ineffective because 
bankruptcy is not an option for other reasons: most managers 
responded that a defaulter would be denied access to credit in the 
future, and that claims could not be effectively recovered through the 
courts. Therefore, the reform seems not have been effective yet 
Getting credit -0.5 Most managers complained about the inability to secure  loans with 
mobile (working) capital. One respondent mentioned a credit window 
against mobile collateral at a Kenyan bank. Here clearly the reforms 
have not been effective on the ground; based on interviews with 
bank managers, this seems to be due to the banks which are 
particularly risk averse at the time of the financial crisis and therefore 
do not adopt the latest changes in regulation 
Protecting 
investors 
n.a. no statements were made regarding this indicator 
: 
Summing up, very diverse responses of managers do not convey a clear picture 
of the regulatory situation at the end of 2010. The average of all responses was 
slightly negative (-0.03), i.e. respondents in November 2010 did not perceive the 
reforms undertaken since 2008 to clearly have improved the business 
environment as measured and defined by the DB indicator sets. The small 
sample size does not provide statistically significant results of the interviews. 
However, the responses of the generally well informed business managers are 
indicative of the (post-2008-) reform regulatory situation in Rwanda.  
 
The below graph illustrates the perception of reforms by the business managers 
interviewed in November 2010. In two areas (starting a business, registering 
property) respondents on average saw improvements of the regulatory 
environment, although in no area was there unanimous agreement on the 
improvements. In the six 32remaining areas respondents perceived the situation 
as not reflecting reform efforts; the least progress was made with respect to 
capital availability, trade and closing a business.  
 
 
 
Figure 11: Summary perceptions of reform effects 
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 Investor protection was not commented by respondents 
   
-1,0 -0,8 -0,6 -0,4 -0,2 0,0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1,0
1)starting a business
2)dealing with construction permits
3)employing workers
4)registering property
5)getting credit
6)protecting investors
7)paying taxes
8)trading across borders
9)enforcing contracts
10) closing a business
average
Perception of reforms on the ground
 
These results compare with the reform measures listed in table 7 (level1). There, 
cumbersome trade regulation was mentioned as a severe problem, a view 
confirmed by the interviews of 2010. However, reforms addressed only a few of 
the specific regulatory problems (processing time), but did not tackle the issue of 
skills in the RRA. Regulation of credit markets did not address the problems 
sufficiently either, as the reforms were not taking into consideration the reluctance 
of banks to make use of the new regulation. Perception of the tax regime has only 
partly been perceived as improved, because valuation issues (in tax assessment 
and in audits) and cash flow issues were not addressed by the reforms. However, 
the time savings allowed by the new regulations was appreciated by most 
businesses33. Finally, respondents on average were neutral towards labor 
regulations, although these were listed specifically in the SBP report.  
 
The general conclusion that reforms did not target the most pressing needs of 
businesses is supported when the results of the 2010 survey are compared with 
the timeline and strength of reforms as measured by DB and illustrated in graphs 
2 to 9. Only in the indicator groups “starting a business” and “registering property” 
did respondents in 2010 confirm that the strong reforms suggested by DB actually 
had had an effect “on the ground”, i.e. were felt by business managers. For four 
indicator groups that showed strong improvement in DB (enforcing contracts, 
trade, paying taxes, getting credit) business managers did on average not report 
an improvement of their situation. This, too, points to a low reliability of DB 
indicators to describe the actual regulatory situation of local businesses in 
Rwanda. 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
 
The reforms undertaken by the Rwandan government addressed areas of 
concern of Rwandan businesses. However, they did not fully reflect the priorities 
                                                             
33 Interestingly, construction permits, enforcement of contracts and procedures for closing a business, 
areas not highlighted in 2008,  were now identified as areas of concern 
 
   
set by respondents of the RTR and they did not always prove to be effective on 
the ground even in areas that were of major concern to local businesses.  
 
Generally, the reforms seem to be geared toward covering areas that are listed in 
the DB indicator sets. Other criteria for an effective and efficient regulatory 
environment, like those mentioned by respondents of the RTR in 2008, seem to 
have been of lower priority to the government.  
 
In can therefore be concluded, that the (perception based)  method underlying the 
RTR more clearly spells out the problems businesses have with existing 
regulation than the (fact based) method of DB does. This is particularly true when 
a cost based assessment of the regulator environment is considered. Whether 
and how a regulatory analysis that spells out the cost of mis-regulation affects 
government decision making is not subject of this analysis. Therefore a 
generalization of this result should not be made.  
 
DB seems to overstate the actual improvement in the regulation of local 
businesses.  This result is confined to the situation in Rwanda. Therefore, a cross 
country analysis of DB results may produce a braoder based conclusion 
regarding the suitability of DB for measuring a country‟s  business environment.  
 
 
4. Summary Conclusion 
 
1. Existing research shows that the link between business environment and 
economic growth is not yet fully clear.  
2. The methods of business environment assessment differ. The most 
prominent method is fact based and applied by the World Bank‟s Doing 
business project. An alternative is the evidence/perception based approach 
used in Rwanda in the broader context of a development cooperation 
project.  
3. For Rwanda, perception based (SBP) and fact based (DB) approaches do 
not yield the same results regarding the demand for regulatory reform. 
4. The supply of reforms appears to be geared to the reform deficiencies as 
defined by DB. However, when regulatory cost is considered, the 
perception based approach also seems to be in line with the reform 
activities of the Rwandan government.  
5. The effectiveness of reforms undertaken in Rwanda varies. Based on 
interviews in late 2010, of the eight areas defined by the DB indicators, 
reforms on average were rather not effective in five areas, rather effective 
in two areas, and neutral in one. This rather neutral perception of the 
Rwandan business environment quality after two years of intensive reforms 
contrasts with the strong improvement of Rwanda in the DB international 
country rankings (from rank 150 in the DB 2008 report to rank 58 in the DB 
   
2011 report). Due to the small sample size of the 2010 survey, the results 
of this survey have to be interpreted with great care, though.  
 
There is need for further research on the subject of assessment and effectiveness 
of regulatory reform.  Problems arising from rankings (the density per quantile 
determines changes in rankings), effects of perception based vis-à-vis fact based 
assessment methods on a broader base, and the political economy framework of 
a country as determinant of reform orientation deserve more empirical research. 
Last not least, the effect of business environment on growth is not yet established 
and requires further attention. This issue, when discussed together with political 
economy criteria, may yield interesting results regarding what “good governance” 
constitutes in general and the mechanics of regulatory reform in particular.    
 
   
Annex 1: DB indicator sets 
 
Indicator Subindicator 
Starting a 
Business 
Procedures (number) 
Time (days) 
Cost (% of income per capita) 
Min. capital (% of income per capita) 
Dealing with 
Construction 
Permits 
Procedures (number) 
Time (days) 
Cost (% of income per capita) 
Registering 
Property 
Procedures (number) 
Time (days) 
Cost (% of property value) 
Getting Credit 
Strength of legal rights index (0-10) 
Depth of credit information index (0-6) 
Public registry coverage (% of adults) 
Private bureau coverage (% of adults) 
Protecting 
Investors 
Extent of disclosure index (0-10) 
Extent of director liability index (0-10) 
Ease of shareholder suits index (0-10) 
Strength of investor protection index (0-10) 
Paying Taxes 
Payments (number per year) 
Time (hours per year) 
Profit tax (%) 
Labor tax and contributions (%) 
Other taxes (%) 
Total tax rate (% profit) 
Trading Across 
Borders 
Documents to export (number) 
Time to export (days) 
Cost to export (US$ per container) 
Documents to import (number) 
Time to import (days) 
Cost to import (US$ per container) 
Enforcing 
Contracts 
Procedures (number) 
Time (days) 
Cost (% of claim) 
Closing a 
Business 
Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 
Time (years) 
Cost (% of estate) 
   
Annex 2: Reforms undertaken 2008 - 2010 
 
Indicator 2008/2009 2009/2010 
Starting a 
Business 
Company registration streamlined 
from 9 procedures in 14 days 
(World Bank standardestimate) to 
2 procedures in 24 hours, all to be 
done at the One Stop Centre. 
Online business registration is now 
operational. This means that a 
company may be incorporated remotely 
or abroad without necessarily coming to 
RDB. For details, visit www.rdb.rw  
Company registration costs 
reduced from the Rwf 12, 000 - 
Frw100, 000 ranges to flat fee of 
Rwf 25,000 irrespective of type 
and number of activities. 
Payment of registration fees may be 
done in cash or with a Bank of Kigali 
point of sale (POS) that accepts 
international cards.  
Dealing with 
Construction 
Permits 
The launch of Kigali MVK client 
charter outlining the procedures of 
acquiring construction permits: the 
issuing agencies and the time 
limits within which a 
business/individual should have 
all the construction paper work 
done. In addition an Electrogaz 
delegate was placed at the one 
stop centre to facilitate 
connections to utilities for 
investors 
A Prime Ministerial order 
legalizing/enforcing time limits for the 
delivery of construction permits 
according to the client charter and 
instituting sanctions for failure to deliver 
has been gazette and is being 
enforced. An appeal mechanism for 
applicants has also been established. 
Average time has reduced from 210 
days to less than 30 days to obtain a 
construction permit.  
 A one stop construction permit centre 
has been established and housed in the 
Nyarugenge district offices to ease 
construction and ensure the time 
prescribed by the client charter is 
respected. The results already speak 
for themselves. For details please visit: 
www.kigalicityconstructionosc.gov.rw  
 Procedures have been reduced with a 
merger of all inspections done into one 
procedure (inspections of land, 
electricity and water). A public notice 
has been issued by the Mayor of Kigali 
city and published in the official gazette.  
Registering 
Property 
Improvements in the process of 
property registration with the 
introduction of a checklist list of all 
documentary requirements by 
RRA together with land registry 
when carrying out property 
transfers. 
The National Land Centre has 
abolished the requirement to formulate 
a sale contract cutting back on time to 
formalize title deeds.  
 Reduction in time to verify property 
ownership to less than 10 days instead 
of 60  
 Streamlining of file checking with 
introduction of checklists  
Getting 
Credit 
The Secured Transaction law will 
make it easier for businesses to 
obtain credit by allowing them to 
use almost any type of movable 
asset as collateral in loan 
transactions 
Improvements to the public credit 
registry have been implemented 
widening the data to cover 2 years of 
credit information and incorporate 
information on utilities.  
 A private bureau has gone online by 
CRB Africa widening its scope to cover 
banking, insurance, and utilities‟ 
(electricity, water and 
   
telecommunications) operations.  
Protecting 
Investors 
The new Insolvency Law will for 
the first time establish a legal 
regime for bankruptcy and creditor 
protection in the country 
 
Paying 
Taxes 
Simplification of paying taxes: 
indicator with the spreading out of 
tax payment points to one more 
additional bank and launching the 
online facility for applying for the 
tax clearance certificate 
RRA has established online tax 
calculators for PAYE, VAT and profit 
taxes to help especially SMEs to 
compute their taxes thus reducing the 
time to file a tax declaration.  
 Quarterly filing of VAT and PAYE has 
been enabled facilitating SMEs with an 
annual turnover of RWF 0-200 million. 
The VAT law amendment has been 
passed and gazetted. This covers more 
than 90% of all tax payers in the 
country.  
 An online tax registration system that 
enables tax payers to register rather 
than physically going to RRA offices 
has been established.  
 RRA has decentralized tax services to 
get closer to tax payers.  
Trading 
Across 
Borders 
 24 hour border operations have 
commenced at Gatuna (Uganda-
Rwanda) border and La Corniche 
(Rwanda DRC).  
 Trade documents have been 
streamlined with the removal of the 
cargo release order and replacing it 
with a stamp.  
 Customs procedures have been 
harmonized with the EAC region while 
non-tariff barriers such as issuance of 
simplified certificates of origin and 
allowing final clearance of goods at the 
border posts have been addressed.  
 A semi-automated single window at 
Customs has been put in place (already 
done at SDV) and to be implemented at 
Gikondo, Airport, Gatsata and Kabuye 
oil depots this year. A fully automated 
system including outer stations and all 
border posts is slated for May 2011.  
 Asycuda ++ (Automated system for 
Customs Data)  has been installed and 
is operational now to all main borders of 
the country and was extended to 
NEMBA boarder and the Post office  
Enforcing 
Contracts 
  
Closing a 
Business 
 Commercial courts have registered a 
number of insolvency cases (6 decided 
and 9 in the pipeline) indicating that the 
practice is growing in Rwanda.  
Source: (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 2009,25); (Ministry of Trade and Industry, 
2010, 20) 
 
 
   
Annex 3: DB assumptions for the standardized business case 
 
The business… 
 Is a limited liability company. If there is more than one type of limited liability company in 
the economy, the limited liability form most popular among domestic firms is chosen. 
Information on the most popular form is obtained from incorporation lawyers or the 
statistical office. 
 Operates in the economy‟s largest business city. It is 100% domestically owned and has 5 
owners, none of whom is a legal entity. 
 Has start-up capital of 10 times income per capita at the end of 2009, paid in cash. 
 Performs general industrial or commercial activities, such as the production or sale to the 
public of products or services. The business does not perform foreign trade activities and 
does not handle products subject to a special tax regime, for example, liquor or tobacco. It 
is not using heavily polluting production processes. 
 Leases the commercial plant and offices and is not a proprietor of real estate. 
 Does not qualify for investment incentives or any special benefits. 
 Has at least 10 and up to 50 employees 1 month after the commencement of operations, 
all of them nationals. 
 Has a turnover of at least 100 times income per capita. 
 Has a company deed 10 pages long. 
 
Source: (World Bank,2010,113-114) 
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